

Spanish youth facing disinformation and artificial intelligence: ideology, perception, and political participation

Jóvenes españoles ante la desinformación y la inteligencia artificial: ideología, percepción y participación política

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Abstract

In a context of growing political disaffection and institutional distrust among Spanish youth, there is an observable increase in sympathy toward authoritarian positions, ideological radicalization, and rejection of parties perceived as adversaries. This situation is escalating with the proliferation of the internet and social media, as well as with the rise of disinformation and the use of artificial intelligence within the online environment. This research analyzes Generation Z's perception of their own ideology, electoral participation and use of the internet and social media to stay informed about politics, as well as their views on disinformation and trust in artificial intelligence. The analysis is based on bivariate tables drawn from a nationwide telephone survey conducted among Spanish residents aged 18 and older. Results indicate that most young people place themselves ideologically on the right (36.5 %), left (27.7 %), or center (21.2 %). However, voting preferences within the right-leaning group are split evenly between the Partido Popular and Vox (50 % each). Over 70 % of young respondents rely on the internet and social networks to stay informed about politics. Furthermore, perceptions of disinformation sources appear to be ideologically driven: over 70 % on the left blame the far right, while 75 % on the right reject that claim. Finally, around 60 % believe AI will worsen institutional and media communication—except far-right supporters.

Keywords

Youth, disinformation, ideology, radicalisation, polarisation, artificial intelligence, internet, social media.

Resumen

En un contexto de creciente desafección política y desconfianza institucional entre la juventud española, se observa una mayor simpatía hacia posturas autoritarias, la radicalización ideológica y el rechazo a los partidos “adversarios”. Esta situación escala con la proliferación de internet y redes sociales, así como con el aumento de la desinformación y la inteligencia artificial. Esta investigación analiza la percepción de la generación Z sobre su ideología, participación electoral, uso de internet y redes sociales para informarse sobre política, la desinformación y confianza en la IA. Para ello, se analizan tablas bivariadas sobre datos de una encuesta telefónica realizada a personas españolas mayores de 18 años. Los resultados evidencian que los jóvenes se auto ubican mayoritariamente a la derecha (36,5 %), izquierda (27,7 %) o centro (21,2 %). Sin embargo, a la hora de votar, partidos como Vox y PP obtienen el mismo apoyo (50 %) entre quienes se identifican con la derecha. Asimismo, más del 70 % de jóvenes se informan a través de las redes sociales e internet y tienden a identificar el origen de la desinformación política en función de su ideología: más del 70 % de los ubicados a la izquierda y extrema izquierda responsabilizan a la extrema derecha, mientras que el 75 % de los de derecha y extrema derecha lo niegan. En torno al 60 % consideran que la IA empeorará la comunicación institucional y mediática, salvo los simpatizantes de la extrema derecha.

Palabras clave

Juventud, desinformación, ideología, radicalización, polarización, inteligencia artificial, internet, redes sociales.

Introduction

Young people and political radicalization

One of the main challenges facing the future of democracy in Spain is the growing disaffection of young people with politics, along with the emergence of anti-establishment attitudes and increased support for authoritarian options.

This is evidenced by data from the CIS (Spanish National Statistics Institute) on the 2019 general election, where the turnout rate among 18- to 24-year-olds was only 17%, and the proportion of young people (18-35 years old) who voted in the last general election held in July 2023 reached 20% (CIS, 2023).

In fact, the latest barometer published by the CIS, corresponding to July 2025, shows that the far-right party VOX is not only attracting young people, new voters, abstainers, and former PP voters in terms of voting intention, but is also expanding its support among those who identify as lower class or poor, as well as among people who are unemployed or engaged in manual labor, a trend that had not been detected until now (CIS, 2025).

In line with this, the 2024 report by the Spanish Youth Council¹ points out, through its Emancipation Observatory, that this lack of credibility can be explained by the absence of solutions to structural problems such as access to housing. This perception translates into low institutional ratings: young people give the Congress of Deputies an average score of 4 out of 10 and rate the performance of political parties at 3.7. Likewise, this entity points out in its report and survey “Rompe el cristal” (Break the Glass), corresponding to 2023,² that six out of ten young people do not feel represented by the Spanish political system, added to which is a declining interest in active political participation, especially with regard to membership of trade unions and political parties (Rojo Puertas, 2024).

Other surveys, such as the barometer produced by the polling company 40dB for the newspaper *El País* in September 2024, indicate that 26% of young men prefer authoritarianism to democracy in certain circumstances; that nearly 70% believe that the democratic system in Spain is deteriorating; and that only half say they feel represented by any political party.³

1 <https://bit.ly/4nXtEFg>

2 <https://bit.ly/40AqkpC>

3 <https://bit.ly/3Ut7yge>

A similar trend is indicated in a recent report by the Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials (ICPS) of Catalonia,⁴ which points out that those under 24 are the least likely to defend democracy as a political system, as only 62% believe it is preferable to another form of government and 16% even say that a dictatorship could be preferable to a democracy, with only 29% responding that living in a democracy is “extremely important.”

The same trend has already been observed in previous studies, such as the one conducted in 2020 by the Centre for the Future of Democracy at the University of Cambridge, entitled “Youth and Satisfaction with Democracy,”⁵ with opinions from nearly five million people surveyed in more than 160 countries, which showed greater dissatisfaction with democracy among millennials—those born between 1981 and 1996—compared to previous generations, as well as growing optimism toward democracies governed by populist leaders.

The values and attitudes of young people set the direction that the political system may take and may also favor the spread of anti-politics, understood as “the position opposed to the institutions and practices that organize coexistence within the framework of plurality and conflict” (Hernández-Carballido, 2023).

Ideological radicalization and extremism—understood as “the belief that the success or survival of one’s own group can never be separated from the need for hostile action against another external group” (Berger, 2018)—is a phenomenon of growing relevance, due to its impact on social stability, national security, and the erosion of democratic values (Conway, 2020).

Extremist activity has progressively migrated to the digital realm, transforming online platforms and communities into key pillars for recruitment, group formation, propaganda dissemination, and mobilization (González-Baquero, Amores, and Arcila-Calderón, 2023).

Added to this is the use of disinformation by far-right populist parties, both globally (Törnberg and Chueri, 2025) and in the Spanish context (Palau-Sampio and Carratalá, 2022; Camargo-Fernández, 2021).

Social media has thus become a primary source of information for these parties. However, it should be noted that the functioning of these platforms is mediated by algorithms which, although designed to “improve the user experience,” also generate echo chambers and filter bubbles (Rodillo, 2024),

4 <https://bit.ly/3TXV5RD>

5 <https://bit.ly/46xMtsB>

effects that diminish pluralism and the diversity of critical voices, thus contributing to the promotion of groupthink. Added to this are the phenomena known as selective exposure and motivated reasoning theory, which show how individuals tend to expose themselves and believe information that reinforces their prior beliefs, while avoiding or rejecting information that contradicts them (Valera-Ordaz, 2023; Kahan, 2013). As a result, polarized environments are created that can lead to ideological homophily dynamics, in which users are exposed exclusively to content aligned with their ideology, which can favor processes of political radicalization (Barberá, 2020).

Thus, users are more likely to share and like negative tweets about politicians of the opposite political persuasion than positive ones about the party they support (Yu *et al.*, 2024).

This polarization is not only ideological but also emotional, promoting “political hooliganism” (Torcal, 2023) and seeking the annihilation of the adversary, now perceived as the enemy (Schmitt, 2009), which helps explain the online growth of far-right parties and movements (Chagas *et al.*, 2022).

In fact, according to the National Strategic Plan for the Prevention and Fight against Violent Radicalization (PENCRAV),⁶ developed by the Spanish Ministry of the Interior, radicalization constitutes a growing threat at both the national and European levels. In the specific case of Spain, there has been an increase in the recruitment of individuals through digital environments, with a particularly worrying impact on vulnerable communities, such as minors and young people at risk.

Political trust, disinformation, and AI

Artificial intelligence has therefore gone from being a technological domain reserved for experts to becoming the focus of debate and expanding its application in the public sphere. The media acts as an active agent in this revolution, as the way in which it represents this technology influences public perception (Brennen *et al.*, 2022).

The crisis of misinformation stems from a deep crisis of mistrust. Citizens feel disconnected from institutions, a fact that is reflected in most studies addressing public opinion. According to the Edelman Trust Barometer

6 <https://bit.ly/3UtzvVd>

(2024),⁷ 63% of the population surveyed in 28 countries (n=32,000) does not trust political leaders, 61% does not trust business leaders, and 64% feels the same way about journalists and reporters. In all cases, mistrust has grown by between one and three points compared to the same survey conducted the previous year. This is also reflected in the specific data for Spain, which ranks among the countries with the highest levels of mistrust among the 28 surveyed. Eighty-one percent do not trust political leaders, 79% do not trust journalists, and 73% do not trust business leaders. Furthermore, 61% of those surveyed expressed fear of misinformation.

Recently, the World Economic Forum in Davos pointed out in its annual Global Risk Report (2024),⁸ that disinformation, along with social polarization and cybersecurity, will be the main global risks worldwide. Thus, disinformation was ranked as the top global risk for the next two years, mainly due to the numerous elections taking place around the world. The report also delves into how AI, without adequate regulation and responsible use, could significantly exacerbate the risks associated with disinformation and polarization (Sedano *et al.*, 2025).

Likewise, organizations such as the United Nations draw attention to the potential benefits and risks involved in the use of AI in electoral processes, such as disinformation and cyberattacks (Spain, 2024).

Various dangers have been identified in the use of AI, such as *deepfakes* (manipulated videos, images, or audio), privacy violations, algorithmic bias, socioeconomic inequality, market volatility, and weapon automation (Thomas, 2024). These dangers raise ethical questions in which the traceability of content—and, therefore, the attribution of responsibility for its consequences—becomes unclear, if not directly opaque (de-Lima-Santos and Ceron, 2021; Coeckelbergh, 2021).

In this regard, the recommendation guide on the ethics of artificial intelligence published by UNESCO (2022)⁹ also addresses the issue of transparency and explanation of AI systems, emphasizing the need to fully inform citizens about whether a decision has been based on algorithms or made using them, and even offering users the possibility of requesting explanations and information about their implementation protocols.

7 <https://bit.ly/4fchTH8>

8 <https://bit.ly/4freHrr>

9 <https://bit.ly/4mdV5ZY>

The transparency and intelligibility of AI are therefore presented as crucial elements for safeguarding human rights, as well as individual and collective self-determination (Mantelero, 2022).

The main cyberattacks are based on disinformation, system vulnerabilities, misuse of the internet and removable devices, or the use of weak passwords. Although in all cases they require the use of complex computer viruses that allow systems to be infected and/or taken over, they all exploit the human factor to achieve their goal (Toledo, 2022).

According to the report presented by Hiscox (2022), the average aggregate cost of cyberattacks suffered by each Spanish company in 2021 amounted to €105,655. Furthermore, 43% of Spanish companies ceased to be operational after suffering a *ransomware* attack—through the use of malicious software—while 28% lost customers as a direct result of a cyberattack.

In recent years, AI has established itself as a disruptive technology in the industry, whose democratization has been driven by the proliferation of pre-trained models accessible on a global scale. According to Gartner (2023), it is estimated that by 2026 approximately 80% of companies will have incorporated these types of models into their processes.

It is estimated that by 2027, these algorithmic advances could take on 10% of the tasks currently assigned to humans, and that this figure will grow exponentially, reaching 50% by 2047 (Grace *et al.*, 2024).

In this regard, the Spain Digital Agenda 2025 proposes several strategic measures related to AI, including: transitioning to a data economy, ensuring security and privacy, and taking advantage of the opportunities offered by AI and Big Data, as well as guaranteeing rights in the new digital environment, particularly labor rights, consumer rights, citizen rights, and business rights (Ministerio de Asuntos Económicos y Transformación Digital, 2025).

As Rouyet (2023) points out, the introduction of new disruptive technologies throughout history, such as the railroad, the telegraph, or the telephone, has always aroused great fear of the destruction of the world, predicting all kinds of calamities, but looking back at the reactions over time, it has also served to “make us smile at how exaggerated they were and amaze us at how, indeed, jobs were destroyed and created” and, equally, “the existing communication landscape was reconfigured” (Calvo *et al.*, 2025).

On the other hand, the use of AI also affects what is known as algorithmic political communication (Campos-Domínguez and García-Orosa, 2018), characterized by micro-segmentation, personalized diagnostics, automated

content generation (Barredo *et al.*, 2021), and the blurring of the lines between what is and what is not fiction (López *et al.*, 2022).

This also has a major impact on the ways in which people obtain information and participate in politics (Claramunt, 2019), with citizens beginning to generate certain forms of resistance and collective self-verification mechanisms through their digital communities (Barredo *et al.*, 2021).

Finally, there is the question of the involvement of AI in improving the quality of governance, which has been considered through two basic dimensions: the impact on the different stages of the public policy formulation cycle and, secondly, the focus on improving the quality of governments and the services they provide, as well as the efficiency of the administrative apparatus (Abu Zaid and Al-Shura, 2022).

In short, AI has two sides to it: while it offers significant potential for identifying and countering disinformation, it also has the capacity to facilitate its creation and spread (Garriga *et al.*, 2024).

For all these reasons, it is essential to further develop regulatory advances, such as the Digital Services Regulation (DSR) and the AI Regulation (AIR), which were created with the aim of making the EU a global leader in the development of safe, trustworthy, and ethical AI, focused on human beings and fundamental rights and democratic values (Castilla-Guerra, 2025; Rebollo-Delgado, 2023).

Materials and method

This study analyzes Generation Z's perceptions in relation to their ideology, electoral behavior, use of the internet and social media to obtain information about politics, as well as their views on disinformation and their trust in artificial intelligence.

This generational group, comprising people born between 1997 and 2012 (Rachmad, 2025), is currently the youngest segment eligible to vote in Spain, making it a subject of interest for this research. As previously stated, young people have a number of specific characteristics and dynamics—such as political disaffection, polarization, and radicalization—that can influence their relationship with the political, communicative, and digital environment and their perception of disinformation and the degree of trust they place in the use of new technologies such as artificial intelligence. For this reason, the

study is limited to young Spaniards between the ages of 18 and 28, belonging to Generation Z.

The objectives of the research are:

- OG: to analyze Generation Z's perspective on their ideology, voting patterns, use of the internet and social media to receive political information, as well as their perception of disinformation and trust in AI.
- SO1: to understand Generation Z's ideology and voting patterns in the 2023 general election.
- SO2: to examine the extent to which Generation Z uses the internet and social media to follow political information.
- SO3: to analyze how Generation Z perceives political disinformation, especially whether they consider the far right to be primarily responsible for spreading fake news.
- SO4: to assess Generation Z's level of agreement with the idea that artificial intelligence can worsen the quality of information received by citizens through public administrations and the media.

The data used in this study comes from a telephone survey conducted using the CATI (*Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing*) method. The authors Alelú-Hernández *et al.* (2010) highlight numerous advantages of this type of survey, such as the possibility of accessing certain population profiles that may be difficult to reach using other methods, as well as its ability to generate a greater willingness to respond on the part of respondents. Nevertheless, its disadvantages must also be taken into account, such as the biases derived from the type of sampling used, which excludes people without a telephone, or the non-response rate not considered in the sampling when randomly dialing telephone numbers.

The fieldwork was carried out between February 1 and 15, 2025, including the Spanish population over the age of 18 as the study universe. The final sample obtained consists of a total of 1,000 individuals, so that in the most unfavorable scenario ($p = q$) and with a confidence level of 95.5%, the margin of error is $\pm 3.1\%$. The sample includes all regions of Spain and was stratified proportionally to the actual population by gender and age quotas, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1
Sample distribution

Gender	Age groups				Total
	18-29	30-49	50-64	65	
Male	77	175	129	104	485
Female	73	173	133	136	515
Total	150	348	265	237	1000

However, given that this research focuses on Generation Z, only individuals aged between 18 and 28 will be taken into account, making a total of 143 people. Although it cannot be said that this subsample fully represents Generation Z at the national level, the number of cases available allows for an initial exploratory analysis, which may lay the groundwork for future research designed specifically for this population.

The processes carried out to meet the proposed objectives are purely quantitative and were performed using IBM SPSS software version 30.0.0. The results were extracted using univariate or bivariate tables to determine the percentage distributions within the group of interest. In the case of the latter, the variable chosen as dependent is ideological self-location, which, despite being coded numerically on a scale of 0 to 10, was recoded as ordinal, since the categorization of continuous variables simplifies the analysis and interpretation of the results (Naggara *et al.*, 2011).

Thus, it became a variable with five distinct categories: extreme left (0-1), left (2-4), center (5), right (6-8), and extreme right (9-10). The independent variables correspond to questions P13 (Type of participation in the 2023 general election) and P14 (Voting intention in the 2023 general election) with the following national parties as the main options: PP [right], PSOE [left], Vox [far right], SUMAR [left]. In addition, the parliamentary spectrum is made up of several nationalist and/or pro-independence parties, located on the right and left, among which the following options were included: Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya [ERC], Junts per Catalunya [JxCat-JUNTS], Euskal Herria Bildu [EH Bildu], Euzko Alderdi Jeltzalea-Partido Nacionalista Vasco [EAJ-PNV], Bloque Nacionalista Galego [BNG], Coalición Canaria [CCa], Unión del Pueblo Navarro [UPN]).

In addition, the following categories were considered: P9 (Degree of monitoring of political information via the internet), P10C (Degree of monitoring of political information via social media), P44 (Degree of agreement with the statement “Fake news about politics comes from the far right”) and P43 (Degree of agreement with the statement “Artificial intelligence will worsen the information that citizens receive from administrations and the media”).

The latter two have also been recoded to simplify the interpretation of the results, grouping them into the following categories: Strongly disagree (0-1), disagree (2-4), neither agree nor disagree (5), agree (6-8), and strongly agree (9-10).

Results

Regarding the ideological self-placement of young people between the ages of 18 and 28, a greater positioning towards the right can be observed (36.50%), followed by the left (27.74%) and the center (21.17%). In this case, the ideological extremes are relegated to the background, with only 8.76% of the sample analyzed opting for the far left and 5.84% for the far right. Thus, in general terms, it can be said that there is a slight tendency towards the right among the young people analyzed, 42.34% compared to 36.5% respectively (sum of percentages of the right plus the far right and vice versa). However, the difference is not sufficient to speak of a clear imposition of one ideology over another.

Table 2

Ideological self-placement of the subsample of people aged 18 to 28 (Generation Z)


Ideological self-placement	Percentage
Far left	8.76%
Left	27.74
Center	21.17

In terms of participation in the 2023 general election, the data shows that people on the left (including the far left) are more likely to vote for a specific party, with 64.71% and 66.67% respectively. These percentages are lower

in the case of the right and its respective ideological extreme, with both positions at 50%. This is because some of their supporters have chosen to abstain (22% and 25%, respectively) or have been unable to exercise their right to vote despite their desire to do so (24% and 25%). It should be noted that the latter situation also occurred in 20.59% of people who declared themselves to be on the left and 27.59% of those in the center. For its part, the far left shows a higher percentage of blank or invalid votes (16.67%), being the only one with such a high score in this category. Particularly striking is the case of centrists, whose voting percentage is the lowest among the different ideologies (24.71%) and whose abstention percentage is the highest compared to the others (41.38%).

Figure 1

Type of participation in the 2023 general election according to ideological self-placement in the subsample of people aged 18 to 28 (Generation Z)




Among voters, most who identify as far left opted for the PSOE and Sumar (50.00% of votes cast in the 2023 general election). On the left, the votes were distributed similarly, with 52.38% for the PSOE, 42.86% for SUMAR, and, as a new development, 4.76% for ERC. Meanwhile, those who identify as centrist divided their votes among different parties, with the majority going to parties such as the PSOE and Vox (28.57% of votes), followed by the PP, SUMAR, and CCa (14.29% of votes).

In contrast, young people on the political right concentrated their votes on PP (50.00%) and Vox (50.00%), as did those on the far right, although with variations in the percentages, with Vox (75.00%) being a majority force over PP (25.00%). In this sense, it can be seen how, in electoral practice, extremist parties such as Vox are gaining ground as one of the preferred options among young people. These results differ to a certain extent from the declared ideological self-placement (Table 2), where the extremes had little presence.

Figure 2

Voting recall for the 2023 general election according to ideological self-placement in the subsample of people aged 18 to 28 (Generation Z)




In relation to following political information online, the results in Figure 3 show that most young people, regardless of their self-reported ideological positioning, frequently use this platform to keep up to date with political news. More than 60% in each group say they do so every day or almost every day, with those on the far left having the highest percentage (72.73%).

However, it should be noted that, as shown in the figure, young people at the extremes (both left and right) tend to follow this content more frequently on the internet, with 100% of those on the far left informing themselves at least four days a week, and 87.5% of those on the far right (sum of the percentages for “Every day or almost every day” and “Four or five days a week”). For their part, the left and right divide their percentages among the various categories, also including options such as “Never or almost never” (7.89% and 8.33% respectively) and “Occasionally” (13.16% and 18.75% respecti-

vely). The latter is also the majority option among the remaining individuals in the center (27.59%) along with “2 or 3 days a week” (10.34%).

Figure 3


Degree of following political information via the internet according to ideological self-placement in the subsample of people aged 18 to 28 (Generation Z)



These results are even more pronounced when it comes to following political information through social media. In this regard, the percentages of daily following are above 70% in all groups, with the case of far-right supporters standing out in particular, where 100% of the young people surveyed say they consume political content on social media every day or almost every day. Unlike what we saw in the previous figure, the percentages in the other categories are much lower (not exceeding 10%), with the exception of the far left, which registers 16.67% in “4 or 5 days a week,” and the right and center, with 12.24% and 10.34%, respectively, in “Never or almost never.”

Figure 4

Degree of following political information through social media according to ideological self-placement in the subsample of people aged 18 to 28 (Generation Z)




Regarding the perception of the origin of disinformation by the far right, the data differ depending on the declared ideology. Most young people who identify as right-wing, centrist, or far-right strongly disagree with the statement “fake news about politics comes from the far right” (75.00% in both related groups and 52% in the center). The remaining people disagree (20.83%, 28.00%, and 25.00%, respectively) or do not have a clear opinion (4.17% on the right and 12.00% in the center in the “neither agree nor disagree” option). However, in none of the cases do those on the ideological right agree or strongly agree with the statement analyzed, and only 8% of those in the center agree with it.

On the contrary, among those on the left and the far left, the predominant positions agree (45.16% and 50.00% respectively) and strongly agree (25.81% in the case of the left). Even so, it should be noted that there are individuals who also disagree (9.68% on the left) or strongly disagree (16.13% and 25.00% respectively) with this statement.

Figure 5

Degree of agreement with the statement “Fake news about politics comes from the far right” according to ideological self-placement in the subsample of people aged 18 to 28 (Generation Z)




Finally, regarding the use of artificial intelligence in communication by public administrations and the media, young people on the far left, left, center, and right agree that it will worsen the quality of information received by citizens, with levels of agreement around 60% (sum of percentages in the “Agree” and “Strongly agree” categories). The rest of the people who sympathize with these ideologies express, to a lesser extent, their disagreement (20.00%, 21.62%, 7.69%, and 18.18%, respectively) or total disagreement (20.00%, 10.81%, 11.54%, and 15.91%, respectively) with the statement.

Only one group differs from the others: those who identify themselves as far right, who strongly disagree (37.5%) or disagree (25.00%). It is also worth noting that 25% of these young people do not express either agreement or disagreement, selecting the option “neither agree nor disagree.” Although there are individuals who agree with the statement analyzed, they only represent 12.50% of the total number of supporters of far-right ideology.

Figure 6

Degree of agreement with the statement “Artificial intelligence will worsen the information that citizens receive from public administrations and the media” according to ideological self-placement in the subsample of people aged 18 to 28 (Generation Z)



Conclusions and discussion

Firstly, it should be noted that the young people of Generation Z analyzed are positioned, with a slight majority, on the right (36.50%), closely followed by those on the left (27.74%) and in the center (21.17%). Although the ideological extremes represent minority percentages, when it comes to voting, Vox concentrates as much of the vote as the Popular Party among the group of people who identify with the right and not with their respective extreme. In addition, there is greater electoral involvement among young people who are ideologically on the left or far left, with a higher voting rate in the last elections than their ideological opponents (64.71% and 66.67% respectively, compared to 50.00%). Thus, among those on the right or far right, there is a higher percentage of abstention or inability to vote, despite the desire to do so (SO1), which is a symptom of their disaffection.

Although differences in political positions can be seen, what the young people in the sample do share is their recurrent monitoring of political in-

formation via the internet and social media. More than 60% of individuals access political information via the internet on a daily basis, regardless of their ideological location. These results increase in the case of social media, rising to over 70%. In this regard, it is worth noting the case of young people on the far right, all of whom (100%) say they consume political information on social media every day or almost every day (SO2), which shows their interest in current political affairs. However, this contrasts with their degree of disaffection when it comes to voting, which is in line with the positions of those who claim that they do not feel represented by the current political parties or who present themselves as anti-system, as indicated by some of the studies mentioned above.

Regarding disinformation, the data show that this phenomenon is perceived selectively: on the one hand, young people who identify as left-wing or far-left blame the far-right for spreading false information, and on the other hand, those who identify as right-wing, centrist, or far-right categorically deny the involvement of the far-right in the origin of political disinformation (SO3). This points to the possibility that the perception of disinformation may be strongly conditioned by ideology, an issue to be explored in future studies.

In any case, these results highlight the need to continue insisting on media literacy training against disinformation in schools, encouraging critical thinking in the use of social media by young people and the verification of information, especially in the face of polarizing and extremist narratives and the use of hate speech.

Finally, with regard to the use of artificial intelligence in institutional and media communication, most young people are distrustful and believe that its implementation could worsen the quality of information received by the public. Only far-right supporters generally disagree with this statement (SO4).

This last statement leaves the door open for future lines of research on the perception of the use of artificial intelligence in areas such as the development of automated discourse, census data segmentation, or the creation of manipulated or disinformation content—such as memes or deepfakes—as well as on how this perception may vary depending on voters' declared ideological self-placement or on whom they attribute responsibility for its use, whether the government and/or the opposition.

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Declaration of Authorship - CRediT Taxonomy	
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José Rúas-Araújo	Conceptualization, original draft writing, writing-revision and editing, supervision and validation.
Uxía Seijas-Vidal	Formal analysis, methodology, original draft writing, revision and editing, visualization.

Declaration on the use of Artificial Intelligence
The authors DECLARE that, in the preparation of the article <i>Young Spaniards and disinformation and artificial intelligence: ideology, perception, and political participation</i> , no artificial intelligence tools were used at any stage of the research process.